On Nuclear Terrorism by Michael Levi

Author:Michael Levi [Levi, Michael]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Public Policy, Political Science, History, Security (National & International), Politics, Terrorism, General
ISBN: 9780674033566
Google: KSEwEAAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 16467635
Publisher: Harvard University Press
Published: 2007-11-01T00:00:00+00:00

From MPC&A to Real Warning

Before reaction to a warning from MPC&A is possible, the right authorities (those potentially able to react effectively) must receive that warning and translate it from data about missing nuclear materials to information about possible nuclear plots, since not every nuclear plot starts with a terrorist theft, and not every theft leads to a plot. The need for the receipt and translation of a warning by authorities introduces new uncertainty and thus reduces the value of MPC&A for warning. Understanding that uncertainty is essential to optimizing any defense.

Warnings of nuclear thefts and warnings of nuclear plots differ in many ways. Nuclear material may already be in circulation, so terrorists may be able to initiate nuclear plots without first stealing material. As a result, even with the most reliable MPC&A systems, no defense can completely let its guard down simply because it has not noticed any recent thefts. In a slight variation on this theme, terrorists might separate their thefts so widely, geographically or over time, that each theft alone would be weak evidence of a plot. MPC&A systems designed to collect evidence not only of thefts themselves but also of information relevant to identifying thieves could help remedy those gaps, as could follow-up investigations after any thefts. Other simple ways of thinking could also reduce uncertainty: for example, two closely spaced thefts executed with similar tactics may be more likely to be linked than two widely separated thefts. Indeed, if facing a highquality MPC&A system, a terrorist group may be more likely to stage its thefts in close succession or simultaneously, rather than over a long period of time: its first theft might trigger a response from authorities, and the terrorist group might want to complete all its thefts before authorities are alerted to the first one.

Even if these problems could be solved, warning would still need to reach those capable of adjusting the defense in response. MPC&A, however, provides information first to local facility operators (though some elements, such as video monitoring, might be transmitted offsite.) Upon ambiguous indication of a theft, managers might hesitate to pass information to others, fearing repercussions both in case of real theft and in case of false alarm; instead, they might attempt to resolve the ambiguity by themselves.39 Even if they decided to pass the information upward within their bureaucracy, it still might not reach those who could best use it. Government officials, for example, might receive information and hoard it, attempting to have elements of government under their control recover the stolen materials; a similar phenomenon might occur within a federal government, as well as internationally between governments. Established protocols and relationships designed for such emergencies might lessen the chance that the information flow would be slowed, but they would provide no guarantees. International monitors might also prevent a state from entirely hiding a theft, but such monitors might also be slow to share information with other states. IAEA inspectors, for example, have proved reluctant to share detailed

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